refactor: replace OpenSSL transports and certificate imports

This commit is contained in:
Kevin Yue committed 2026-11-01 23:35:58 +08:00
1 parent 37c88c7adb
commit 14c4e24e0e
59 files changed
+1072 -1151

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+3 -39
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@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ use crate::{
pub mod args;
pub trait Args {
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
fn fix_openssl(&self) -> bool;
fn ignore_tls_errors(&self) -> bool;
/// How this program renders its logs.
@@ -43,14 +41,6 @@ fn retry_hints(err: &anyhow::Error, args: &impl Args) -> Vec<String> {
// users already see; keep it exactly.
let mut hints = Vec::new();
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
if kind == ServerTlsErrorKind::LegacyRenegotiation && !args.fix_openssl() {
let (program, rest) = command_line();
hints.push(format!(
"Re-run it with the `--fix-openssl` option to work around this issue, e.g.:\n\n{program} --fix-openssl {rest}"
));
}
if kind == ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate && !args.ignore_tls_errors() {
let (program, rest) = command_line();
hints.push(format!(
@@ -204,18 +194,11 @@ mod tests {
#[derive(Default)]
struct TestArgs {
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
fix_openssl: bool,
ignore_tls_errors: bool,
log_format: LogFormat,
}
impl Args for TestArgs {
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
fn fix_openssl(&self) -> bool {
self.fix_openssl
}
fn ignore_tls_errors(&self) -> bool {
self.ignore_tls_errors
}
@@ -260,31 +243,12 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn hints_distinguish_legacy_and_unknown_tls_and_respect_both_flags() {
let legacy = ServerTlsError {
server: "https://vpn.example.com".into(),
kind: ServerTlsErrorKind::LegacyRenegotiation,
};
let hints = retry_hints(&anyhow!(legacy.clone()), &TestArgs::default());
if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
assert!(hints.is_empty());
} else {
assert_eq!(hints.len(), 1);
assert!(hints[0].contains("--fix-openssl"));
}
let args = TestArgs {
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
fix_openssl: true,
ignore_tls_errors: true,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(retry_hints(&anyhow!(legacy), &args).is_empty());
assert!(retry_hints(&anyhow!(certificate_error()), &args).is_empty());
let other = ServerTlsError {
fn unknown_tls_failure_does_not_suggest_bypassing_certificate_validation() {
let error = ServerTlsError {
server: "https://vpn.example.com".into(),
kind: ServerTlsErrorKind::Other,
};
assert!(retry_hints(&anyhow!(other), &TestArgs::default()).is_empty());
assert!(retry_hints(&anyhow!(error), &TestArgs::default()).is_empty());
}
/// Suggesting an option the user already passed is noise, and in JSON mode it
+106 -172
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@@ -4,13 +4,6 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use super::PortalError;
#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
#[path = "server_tls/apple.rs"]
mod backend;
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")))]
#[path = "server_tls/openssl.rs"]
mod backend;
/// A VPN HTTP TLS failure. The server identifies the configured VPN origin,
/// not necessarily the peer that failed after an HTTP redirect.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -25,7 +18,6 @@ pub struct ServerTlsError {
pub enum ServerTlsErrorKind {
Certificate,
ClientCertificateRequired,
LegacyRenegotiation,
Other,
}
@@ -43,7 +35,6 @@ impl fmt::Display for ServerTlsError {
let message = match self.kind {
ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate => "The server's certificate could not be verified",
ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired => "The server requires a client certificate",
ServerTlsErrorKind::LegacyRenegotiation => "The server requires unsafe legacy TLS renegotiation",
ServerTlsErrorKind::Other => "A secure connection to the server could not be established",
};
write!(f, "{message}: {}", self.server)
@@ -70,122 +61,25 @@ impl ServerTlsErrorKind {
pub(super) fn classify(error: &(dyn Error + 'static)) -> Option<ServerTlsErrorKind> {
let mut source = Some(error);
let mut fallback = None;
while let Some(error) = source {
if let Some(tls) = error.downcast_ref::<ServerTlsError>() {
return Some(tls.kind);
}
if let Some(kind) = backend::classify(error) {
return Some(kind);
}
if let Some(tls) = error.downcast_ref::<native_tls::Error>() {
let kind = classify_native(tls);
if kind != ServerTlsErrorKind::Other {
return Some(kind);
}
fallback = Some(kind);
if let Some(tls) = error.downcast_ref::<rustls::Error>() {
return Some(match tls {
rustls::Error::InvalidCertificate(_) => ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate,
rustls::Error::AlertReceived(rustls::AlertDescription::CertificateRequired) => {
ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired
}
_ => ServerTlsErrorKind::Other,
});
}
source = error
.downcast_ref::<std::io::Error>()
.and_then(|error| error.get_ref().map(|inner| inner as &(dyn Error + 'static)))
.or_else(|| error.source());
}
fallback
}
fn classify_native(error: &native_tls::Error) -> ServerTlsErrorKind {
// native-tls hides some backend reason codes and verification results. Keep
// backend text matching here, scoped to a confirmed native TLS error.
let detail = format!("{error:?}").to_ascii_lowercase();
classify_native_detail(&detail)
}
fn classify_native_detail(detail: &str) -> ServerTlsErrorKind {
// native-tls forwards Security.framework's Debug representation, but hides
// its OSStatus from the public error chain. Prefer that status to localized
// text, including for peer alerts that can mention a rejected client cert.
if let Some(code) = detail
.strip_prefix("error { code: ")
.and_then(|detail| detail.split_once(','))
.and_then(|(code, _)| code.parse::<i32>().ok())
{
return classify_macos_status(code);
}
if detail.contains("unsafe legacy renegotiation") {
return ServerTlsErrorKind::LegacyRenegotiation;
}
if detail.contains("alert certificate required") {
return ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired;
}
let certificate = [
"certificate verify failed",
"certificate verification failed",
"certificate was not trusted",
"certificate is not trusted",
"self signed certificate",
"hostname mismatch",
"certificate has expired",
"certificate is not yet valid",
"certificate has been revoked",
]
.iter()
.any(|reason| detail.contains(reason));
if certificate {
ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate
} else {
ServerTlsErrorKind::Other
}
}
fn classify_macos_status(code: i32) -> ServerTlsErrorKind {
if code == -9863 {
return ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired;
}
// Local server-certificate validation failures from Security/SecBase.h.
// Peer alerts (errSSLPeer*) reject our client certificate; protocol/cipher,
// keychain, and internal errors also cannot be fixed by skipping server trust.
let certificate = matches!(
code,
-9807 // errSSLXCertChainInvalid
| -9812 // errSSLUnknownRootCert
| -9813 // errSSLNoRootCert
| -9814 // errSSLCertExpired
| -9815 // errSSLCertNotYetValid
| -9843 // errSSLHostNameMismatch
| -9884 // errSSLATSLeafCertificateHashAlgorithmViolation
| -9885 // errSSLATSCertificateHashAlgorithmViolation
| -9886 // errSSLATSCertificateTrustViolation
| -67602 // errSecHostNameMismatch
| -67603 // errSecUnknownCriticalExtensionFlag
| -67604 // errSecNoBasicConstraints
| -67605 // errSecNoBasicConstraintsCA
| -67606 // errSecInvalidAuthorityKeyID
| -67607 // errSecInvalidSubjectKeyID
| -67608 // errSecInvalidKeyUsageForPolicy
| -67609 // errSecInvalidExtendedKeyUsage
| -67610 // errSecInvalidIDLinkage
| -67611 // errSecPathLengthConstraintExceeded
| -67612 // errSecInvalidRoot
| -67629 // errSecSSLBadExtendedKeyUsage
| -67654 // errSecTrustSettingDeny
| -67818 // errSecCertificateExpired
| -67819 // errSecCertificateNotValidYet
| -67820 // errSecCertificateRevoked
| -67821 // errSecCertificateSuspended
| -67826 // errSecInvalidCertAuthority
| -67843 // errSecNotTrusted
| -67899 // errSecCertificatePolicyNotAllowed
| -67900 // errSecCertificateNameNotAllowed
| -67901 // errSecCertificateValidityPeriodTooLong
| -67902 // errSecCertificateIsCA
| -67903 // errSecCertificateDuplicateExtension
| -67904 // errSecMissingQualifiedCertStatement
);
if certificate {
ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate
} else {
ServerTlsErrorKind::Other
}
None
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -207,39 +101,26 @@ mod tests {
};
#[test]
fn explicit_client_certificate_requirement_has_a_distinct_kind() {
let kind = classify_native_detail("error { code: -9863, message: \"localized message\" }");
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(kind).unwrap(), "clientCertificateRequired");
assert_eq!(
classify_native_detail("error { code: -9842, message: \"client cert requested\" }"),
ServerTlsErrorKind::Other
);
}
#[test]
fn macos_certificate_statuses_do_not_depend_on_the_error_message() {
for code in [-67818, -67819, -67820, -67843, -67602, -67629, -67899, -67901] {
let detail = format!("error {{ code: {code}, message: \"localized message\" }}");
fn typed_tls_causes_distinguish_local_trust_from_peer_alerts() {
for reason in [
rustls::CertificateError::Expired,
rustls::CertificateError::UnknownIssuer,
] {
let error = std::io::Error::other(std::io::Error::other(rustls::Error::InvalidCertificate(reason)));
assert_eq!(classify(&error), Some(ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate));
}
for alert in [
rustls::AlertDescription::UnknownCA,
rustls::AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
] {
assert_eq!(
classify_native_detail(&detail),
ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate,
"{code}"
classify(&rustls::Error::AlertReceived(alert)),
Some(ServerTlsErrorKind::Other)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn macos_peer_alerts_and_handshake_errors_are_not_certificate_validation_failures() {
for (code, message) in [
(-9800, "SSL protocol error"),
(-9801, "Cipher Suite negotiation failure"),
(-9828, "peer certificate has expired"),
(-9831, "unknown certificate authority"),
(-9850, "weak ephemeral DH key"),
] {
let detail = format!("error {{ code: {code}, message: \"{message}\" }}").to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(classify_native_detail(&detail), ServerTlsErrorKind::Other, "{code}");
}
let required = rustls::Error::AlertReceived(rustls::AlertDescription::CertificateRequired);
assert_eq!(classify(&required), Some(ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired));
assert_eq!(classify(&std::io::Error::other("certificate verify failed")), None);
}
fn server(tls: bool) -> (String, thread::JoinHandle<()>) {
@@ -335,7 +216,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn incompatible_tls_is_not_a_certificate_error_even_with_bypass() {
let (address, worker) = server(false);
let error = reqwest::Client::builder()
let error = crate::utils::request::client_builder()
.no_proxy()
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
.build()
@@ -354,7 +235,7 @@ mod tests {
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
let address = format!("https://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
drop(listener);
let error = reqwest::Client::builder()
let error = crate::utils::request::client_builder()
.no_proxy()
.build()
.unwrap()
@@ -365,17 +246,6 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(classify(&error), None);
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
#[test]
fn wrapped_macos_io_status_retains_the_client_certificate_requirement() {
let error = std::io::Error::other(std::io::Error::other(security_framework::base::Error::from(-9863)));
let server = url::Url::parse("https://vpn.example.com/login?token=secret").unwrap();
let tls = ServerTlsError::from_request(&server, &error).unwrap();
assert_eq!(tls.kind, ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired);
assert_eq!(tls.server, "https://vpn.example.com");
assert_eq!(classify(&std::io::Error::other("alert certificate required")), None);
}
#[cfg(feature = "desktop")]
#[test]
fn rendering_recovery_retains_client_certificate_requirement() {
@@ -436,19 +306,11 @@ mod tests {
worker.join().unwrap();
let kind =
ServerTlsErrorKind::from_error(&error).unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{operation}: unclassified: {error:?}"));
// Secure Transport's TLS 1.2 handshake can return only a generic peer alert.
if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
assert!(matches!(
kind,
ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired | ServerTlsErrorKind::Other
));
} else {
assert_eq!(
kind,
ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired,
"{operation}: {error:?}"
);
}
assert_eq!(
kind,
ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired,
"{operation}: {error:?}"
);
}
}
@@ -484,6 +346,78 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn imported_identity_formats_complete_mutual_tls_prelogin() {
use crate::{
gp_params::GpParams,
os_profile::{ClientOs, OsProfile},
portal::{PreloginOptions, prelogin},
};
let fixture = |name: &str| format!("{}/tests/files/client-identity/{name}", env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
for (certificate, key, password) in [
(
"rsa-cert.pem",
Some("rsa-traditional-aes256.pem"),
Some("fixture-password"),
),
("ec-cert.pem", Some("ec-traditional-des3.pem"), Some("fixture-password")),
("rsa-cert.pem", Some("rsa-pbes1-3des.pem"), Some("fixture-password")),
("rsa-cert.pem", Some("rsa-pbes2-scrypt.pem"), Some("fixture-password")),
("ec-cert.pem", Some("ec-sec1.pem"), None),
("modern.p12", None, Some("fixture-password")),
("legacy-rc2.p12", None, Some("fixture-password")),
("empty-password.p12", None, None),
("no-bag-ids.p12", None, None),
] {
let (address, worker) = server_with_client_auth(true, SslVerifyMode::PEER | SslVerifyMode::FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT);
let mut builder =
GpParams::builder(OsProfile::builder(ClientOs::Linux).build(crate::os_profile::test_snapshot()));
builder
.ignore_tls_errors(true)
.certificate(Some(fixture(certificate)))
.sslkey(key.map(fixture))
.key_password(password.map(str::to_owned));
let mut params = builder.build();
params
.prepare_client_identity()
.unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{certificate}/{key:?}: {error:?}"));
let result = prelogin(&address, &params, PreloginOptions::default()).await;
worker.join().unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
result.unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{certificate}/{key:?}: {error:?}")),
crate::portal::Prelogin::Saml(_)
));
}
}
/// Point at the GnuTLS fixture configured without RFC 5746, with a trusted test root.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore = "requires GP_TLS_TEST_SERVER and GP_TLS_TEST_CA for the external GnuTLS fixture"]
async fn tls12_peer_without_renegotiation_extension_uses_default_policy() {
let server = std::env::var("GP_TLS_TEST_SERVER").unwrap();
let root = std::fs::read(std::env::var("GP_TLS_TEST_CA").unwrap()).unwrap();
let client = crate::utils::request::client_builder()
.no_proxy()
.add_root_certificate(reqwest::Certificate::from_pem(&root).unwrap())
.build()
.unwrap();
assert!(client.get(&server).send().await.unwrap().status().is_success());
let error = crate::utils::request::client_builder()
.no_proxy()
.build()
.unwrap()
.get(&server)
.send()
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(
ServerTlsError::from_request(&url::Url::parse(&server).unwrap(), &error)
.unwrap()
.kind,
ServerTlsErrorKind::Certificate
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn failed_response_reads_preserve_the_transport_cause() {
for status in [200, 403] {
@@ -500,7 +434,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.unwrap();
});
let response = reqwest::Client::builder()
let response = crate::utils::request::client_builder()
.no_proxy()
.build()
.unwrap()
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
use std::error::Error;
use super::{ServerTlsErrorKind, classify_macos_status};
pub(super) fn classify(error: &(dyn Error + 'static)) -> Option<ServerTlsErrorKind> {
error
.downcast_ref::<security_framework::base::Error>()
.map(|error| classify_macos_status(error.code()))
}
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
use std::error::Error;
use super::ServerTlsErrorKind;
pub(super) fn classify(error: &(dyn Error + 'static)) -> Option<ServerTlsErrorKind> {
let stack = error.downcast_ref::<openssl::error::ErrorStack>().or_else(|| {
error
.downcast_ref::<openssl::ssl::Error>()
.and_then(openssl::ssl::Error::ssl_error)
})?;
// ERR_LIB_SSL and SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED from sslerr.h.
stack
.errors()
.iter()
.any(|error| error.library_code() == 20 && error.reason_code() == 1116)
.then_some(ServerTlsErrorKind::ClientCertificateRequired)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ impl GpParams {
}
pub(crate) fn client_builder(&self) -> anyhow::Result<ClientBuilder> {
let mut builder = Client::builder()
let mut builder = crate::utils::request::client_builder()
.tls_info(true)
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(self.ignore_tls_errors)
.user_agent(self.user_agent());
+1 -21
View File
@@ -33,8 +33,6 @@ pub struct SamlAuthLauncher<'a> {
certificate: Option<&'a str>,
sslkey: Option<&'a str>,
key_password: Option<&'a str>,
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
fix_openssl: bool,
ignore_tls_errors: bool,
#[cfg(feature = "webview-auth")]
hidpi: bool,
@@ -67,8 +65,6 @@ impl<'a> SamlAuthLauncher<'a> {
certificate: None,
sslkey: None,
key_password: None,
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
fix_openssl: false,
ignore_tls_errors: false,
#[cfg(feature = "webview-auth")]
hidpi: false,
@@ -115,12 +111,6 @@ impl<'a> SamlAuthLauncher<'a> {
self
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
pub fn fix_openssl(mut self, fix_openssl: bool) -> Self {
self.fix_openssl = fix_openssl;
self
}
pub fn ignore_tls_errors(mut self, ignore_tls_errors: bool) -> Self {
self.ignore_tls_errors = ignore_tls_errors;
self
@@ -229,11 +219,6 @@ impl<'a> SamlAuthLauncher<'a> {
auth_cmd.arg("--client-version").arg(client_version);
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
if self.fix_openssl {
auth_cmd.arg("--fix-openssl");
}
if self.ignore_tls_errors {
auth_cmd.arg("--ignore-tls-errors");
}
@@ -419,13 +404,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn launches_with_platform_tls_options() {
let launcher = SamlAuthLauncher::new("vpn.example.com").ignore_tls_errors(true);
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
let launcher = launcher.fix_openssl(true);
let args = child_args(launcher);
assert_eq!(
args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--fix-openssl"),
!cfg!(target_os = "macos")
);
assert!(!args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--fix-openssl"));
assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--ignore-tls-errors"));
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ async fn gateway_fixture(
requests
});
let transport = GatewayTransport {
client: Client::builder()
client: crate::utils::request::client_builder()
.redirect(Policy::none())
.no_proxy()
.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT)
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <gnutls/x509.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stddef.h>
/* Only decrypted PKCS#8 leaves this interface. The Rust owner releases it with
* gp_key_free, so GnuTLS allocation and wiping stay with the native allocator. */
int gp_key_import(const unsigned char *input, size_t length, int pem,
const char *password, unsigned char **output, size_t *output_length) {
gnutls_x509_privkey_t key = NULL;
gnutls_datum_t exported = {NULL, 0};
int result;
*output = NULL;
*output_length = 0;
if (length > UINT_MAX) return 3;
result = gnutls_global_init();
if (result < 0) return 3;
result = gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&key);
if (result >= 0) {
gnutls_datum_t data = {(unsigned char *)input, (unsigned int)length};
result = gnutls_x509_privkey_import2(key, &data,
pem ? GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM : GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, password, 0);
}
if (result >= 0) {
result = gnutls_x509_privkey_export2_pkcs8(key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER,
NULL, GNUTLS_PKCS_PLAIN, &exported);
}
if (key != NULL) gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(key);
gnutls_global_deinit();
if (result >= 0) {
*output = exported.data;
*output_length = exported.size;
return 0;
}
if (result == GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED) return 1;
if (result == GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE || result == GNUTLS_E_UNIMPLEMENTED_FEATURE)
return 2;
return 3;
}
void gp_key_free(unsigned char *data, size_t length) {
if (data != NULL) {
gnutls_memset(data, 0, length);
gnutls_free(data);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
use std::ffi::{c_char, c_int};
use pkcs8::SecretDocument;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use crate::utils::request::RequestIdentityError;
unsafe extern "C" {
fn gp_key_import(
input: *const u8,
length: usize,
pem: c_int,
password: *const c_char,
output: *mut *mut u8,
output_length: *mut usize,
) -> c_int;
fn gp_key_free(data: *mut u8, length: usize);
}
struct ExportedKey {
data: *mut u8,
length: usize,
}
impl Drop for ExportedKey {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// The shim owns the allocation and wipes it before releasing it.
unsafe { gp_key_free(self.data, self.length) };
}
}
pub(in crate::utils) fn decrypt(bytes: &[u8], pem: bool, passphrase: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<SecretDocument> {
let passphrase = passphrase.ok_or(RequestIdentityError::NoPassphrase("PEM"))?;
anyhow::ensure!(
!passphrase.as_bytes().contains(&0),
"Private key passphrases containing NUL are not supported"
);
let mut password = Zeroizing::new(passphrase.as_bytes().to_vec());
password.push(0);
let mut exported = ExportedKey {
data: std::ptr::null_mut(),
length: 0,
};
// All input slices remain live for the call; the output is owned by the guard.
let result = unsafe {
gp_key_import(
bytes.as_ptr(),
bytes.len(),
i32::from(pem),
password.as_ptr().cast(),
&mut exported.data,
&mut exported.length,
)
};
match result {
0 => {
anyhow::ensure!(!exported.data.is_null() && exported.length > 0, "Invalid private key");
// A successful shim call returns an initialized allocation of this length.
let bytes = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(exported.data, exported.length) };
SecretDocument::try_from(bytes).map_err(|_| RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey.into())
}
1 => Err(RequestIdentityError::DecryptError("PEM").into()),
2 => Err(RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedEncryption.into()),
_ => Err(RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey.into()),
}
}
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
//! Optional compatibility conversion for standalone PKCS#12 PBE-SHA1-3DES keys.
//! The executable is a runtime option, not a linked or bundled dependency.
use std::{
io::{ErrorKind, Read, Write},
os::{fd::AsFd, unix::process::CommandExt},
process::{Child, Command, Stdio},
thread,
time::{Duration, Instant},
};
use nix::{
fcntl::{FcntlArg, OFlag, fcntl},
sys::signal::{Signal, killpg},
unistd::Pid,
};
use pkcs8::SecretDocument;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use crate::utils::request::RequestIdentityError::{self, LegacyKeyConversion};
const TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
const MAX_OUTPUT: u64 = 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_PASSWORD_BYTES: usize = 1023;
// The converter owns a separate process group, including wrapper descendants.
// Clean up that group and reap the direct child on every return path.
struct Converter(Child);
impl Drop for Converter {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = killpg(Pid::from_raw(self.0.id() as i32), Signal::SIGKILL);
let _ = self.0.wait();
}
}
fn nonblocking(pipe: &impl AsFd) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
fcntl(pipe, FcntlArg::F_SETFL(OFlag::O_NONBLOCK))
.map_err(|_| LegacyKeyConversion("could not configure converter pipes"))?;
Ok(())
}
// Read at most one chunk per iteration so a busy pipe cannot starve the deadline.
// Returns true only after EOF; inherited pipes remain subject to the deadline.
fn read_output(pipe: &mut impl Read, output: &mut Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>, limit: u64) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
let mut buffer = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 8192]);
match pipe.read(buffer.as_mut_slice()) {
Ok(0) => Ok(true),
Ok(count) => {
if output.len() as u64 + count as u64 > limit {
return Err(LegacyKeyConversion("converter output exceeds the size limit").into());
}
output.extend_from_slice(&buffer[..count]);
Ok(false)
}
Err(error) if matches!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::WouldBlock | ErrorKind::Interrupted) => Ok(false),
Err(_) => Err(LegacyKeyConversion("could not read converter output").into()),
}
}
pub(in crate::utils) fn decrypt(der: &[u8], passphrase: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<SecretDocument> {
let passphrase = passphrase.ok_or(RequestIdentityError::NoPassphrase("PEM"))?;
// The command's line reader reserves one byte for a terminator. The linked
// OpenSSL API accepted 1024 bytes, but the CLI would truncate that password.
if passphrase.len() > MAX_PASSWORD_BYTES {
return Err(LegacyKeyConversion("the password exceeds OpenSSL's 1023-byte input limit").into());
}
// OpenSSL's pipe password source reads one line. Never silently truncate it.
if passphrase.contains(['\r', '\n', '\0']) {
return Err(LegacyKeyConversion("the password cannot be passed through OpenSSL's line-based input").into());
}
// Only encrypted input touches disk, in a private temporary file. The
// original file is never changed and decrypted output stays in memory.
let mut input = tempfile::NamedTempFile::new()?;
input.write_all(pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new("ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY", der)).as_bytes())?;
let child = Command::new("openssl")
.args([
"pkcs8", "-topk8", "-nocrypt", "-inform", "PEM", "-outform", "DER", "-in",
])
.arg(input.path())
.args(["-passin", "stdin"])
.env("LC_ALL", "C")
.process_group(0)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.map_err(|_| LegacyKeyConversion("the openssl executable is unavailable"))?;
let mut converter = Converter(child);
let mut stdin = converter.0.stdin.take();
let mut stdout = converter.0.stdout.take().unwrap();
let mut stderr = converter.0.stderr.take().unwrap();
nonblocking(stdin.as_ref().unwrap())?;
nonblocking(&stdout)?;
nonblocking(&stderr)?;
let mut password = Zeroizing::new(passphrase.as_bytes().to_vec());
password.push(b'\n');
let mut written = 0;
let mut input_failed = false;
let mut output = Zeroizing::new(Vec::new());
let mut diagnostic = Zeroizing::new(Vec::new());
let mut output_done = false;
let mut diagnostic_done = false;
let mut status = None;
let started = Instant::now();
let status = loop {
if started.elapsed() >= TIMEOUT {
return Err(LegacyKeyConversion("conversion timed out").into());
}
if let Some(pipe) = stdin.as_mut() {
match pipe.write(&password[written..]) {
Ok(0) => {
input_failed = true;
stdin = None;
}
Ok(count) => {
written += count;
if written == password.len() {
stdin = None;
}
}
Err(error) if matches!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::WouldBlock | ErrorKind::Interrupted) => {}
Err(_) => {
input_failed = true;
stdin = None;
}
}
}
if !output_done {
output_done = read_output(&mut stdout, &mut output, MAX_OUTPUT)?;
}
if !diagnostic_done {
diagnostic_done = read_output(&mut stderr, &mut diagnostic, 16 * 1024)?;
}
if status.is_none() {
status = converter
.0
.try_wait()
.map_err(|_| LegacyKeyConversion("could not wait for the converter"))?;
}
if let Some(status) = status {
if output_done && diagnostic_done && stdin.is_none() {
break status;
}
}
thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
};
if status.success() && input_failed {
return Err(LegacyKeyConversion("could not send the password").into());
}
if !status.success() {
// Never include the command's output in user-facing errors: it can contain
// key material. Preserve the old Linux password retry contract only for
// an explicit decryption failure, not missing cipher/provider support.
if [b"bad decrypt".as_slice(), b"pkcs12 cipherfinal error".as_slice()]
.iter()
.any(|message| diagnostic.windows(message.len()).any(|window| window == *message))
{
return Err(RequestIdentityError::DecryptError("PEM").into());
}
return Err(LegacyKeyConversion("this OpenSSL installation cannot decrypt the key").into());
}
SecretDocument::try_from(output.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LegacyKeyConversion("invalid converted key").into())
}
+19 -17
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[path = "pkcs12/macos.rs"]
pub(super) mod pkcs12_identity;
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")))]
#[path = "pkcs12/openssl.rs"]
pub(super) mod pkcs12_identity;
#[cfg(target_os = "ios")]
#[path = "pkcs12/ios.rs"]
pub(super) mod pkcs12_identity;
#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
#[path = "traditional_key/apple.rs"]
pub(super) mod traditional_key;
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")))]
#[path = "traditional_key/openssl.rs"]
pub(super) mod traditional_key;
pub(super) mod pkcs12;
#[cfg(feature = "desktop")]
pub(super) mod legacy_pkcs8;
#[cfg(any(
target_os = "macos",
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "openbsd"
))]
#[path = "gnutls.rs"]
mod legacy_key;
#[cfg(not(any(
target_os = "macos",
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "openbsd"
)))]
#[path = "unsupported.rs"]
mod legacy_key;
pub(super) use legacy_key::decrypt as decrypt_key;
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
use p12_keystore::Pkcs12Archive;
use rustls::{
pki_types::{CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer, PrivatePkcs8KeyDer},
sign::CertifiedKey,
};
use crate::utils::request::{RequestIdentityError, pem_request_identity};
pub(in crate::utils) fn identity(bytes: &[u8], passphrase: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<reqwest::Identity> {
anyhow::ensure!(
passphrase.is_none_or(|password| !password.as_bytes().contains(&0)),
"PKCS#12 passphrases containing NUL are not supported"
);
let archive = Pkcs12Archive::from_pkcs12(bytes, passphrase.unwrap_or_default()).map_err(|error| {
if passphrase.is_none() {
RequestIdentityError::NoPassphrase("PKCS#12")
} else {
RequestIdentityError::InvalidPkcs12(error)
}
})?;
if archive.keys.is_empty() || archive.certs.is_empty() {
return Err(RequestIdentityError::IncompletePkcs12.into());
}
if archive.keys.len() != 1 {
return Err(RequestIdentityError::AmbiguousPkcs12.into());
}
let key = &archive.keys[0].key;
let provider = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider();
let mut certs = Vec::new();
for bag in &archive.certs {
if !certs
.iter()
.any(|cert: &&p12_keystore::Certificate| cert.as_der() == bag.cert.as_der())
{
certs.push(&bag.cert);
}
}
let matches: Vec<_> = certs
.iter()
.enumerate()
.filter_map(|(index, cert)| {
let private_key = PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(key.as_der().to_vec()));
CertifiedKey::from_der(
vec![CertificateDer::from(cert.as_der().to_vec())],
private_key,
&provider,
)
.is_ok()
.then_some(index)
})
.collect();
let leaf = match matches.as_slice() {
[leaf] => *leaf,
[] => return Err(RequestIdentityError::InvalidCertificate.into()),
_ => return Err(RequestIdentityError::AmbiguousPkcs12.into()),
};
let mut current = certs.remove(leaf);
let mut chain = Vec::new();
loop {
chain.extend_from_slice(pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", current.as_der())).as_bytes());
if current.subject() == current.issuer() {
break;
}
let Some(parent) = certs.iter().position(|cert| cert.subject() == current.issuer()) else {
break;
};
current = certs.remove(parent);
}
let key = pkcs8::SecretDocument::try_from(key.as_der()).map_err(|_| RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey)?;
let key = key.to_pem("PRIVATE KEY", pkcs8::LineEnding::LF)?;
pem_request_identity(&chain, key.as_bytes())
}
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
use crate::utils::request::RequestIdentityError;
use security_framework::import_export::Pkcs12ImportOptions;
pub(in crate::utils) fn ensure_complete(bytes: &[u8], password: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
if let Ok(imports) = Pkcs12ImportOptions::new().passphrase(password).import(bytes)
&& !imports.last().is_some_and(|item| item.identity.is_some())
{
return Err(RequestIdentityError::IncompletePkcs12.into());
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
use security_framework::{import_export::Pkcs12ImportOptions, os::macos::keychain::CreateOptions};
use crate::utils::request::RequestIdentityError;
pub(in crate::utils) fn ensure_complete(bytes: &[u8], password: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
// native-tls assumes a successful import has a last item with an identity.
// Incomplete archives violate that assumption and panic. Inspect them first
// in a private temporary keychain, never the user's default keychain.
let directory = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let keychain = CreateOptions::new()
.password(&uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string())
.create(directory.path().join("identity.keychain"))?;
if let Ok(imports) = Pkcs12ImportOptions::new()
.keychain(keychain)
.passphrase(password)
.import(bytes)
&& !imports.last().is_some_and(|item| item.identity.is_some())
{
return Err(RequestIdentityError::IncompletePkcs12.into());
}
// Leave failed imports to reqwest so password errors retain their existing
// classification and native error chain.
Ok(())
}
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
use openssl::pkcs12::Pkcs12;
use crate::utils::request::RequestIdentityError;
pub(in crate::utils) fn ensure_complete(bytes: &[u8], password: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
// Parse errors belong to the existing native TLS importer. A successful parse
// lets us report incomplete archives without suggesting a password change.
if let Ok(archive) = Pkcs12::from_der(bytes).and_then(|archive| archive.parse2(password))
&& (archive.pkey.is_none() || archive.cert.is_none())
{
return Err(RequestIdentityError::IncompletePkcs12.into());
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
use pkcs8::SecretDocument;
use crate::utils::{identity_encoding::TraditionalKeyFormat, request::RequestIdentityError};
pub(in crate::utils) fn normalize(
_bytes: &[u8],
format: TraditionalKeyFormat,
_passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> anyhow::Result<SecretDocument> {
Err(
match format {
TraditionalKeyFormat::EncryptedPem => RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedEncryption,
TraditionalKeyFormat::PlainPem | TraditionalKeyFormat::Sec1Der => RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedKeyFormat,
}
.into(),
)
}
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
use openssl::{
error::ErrorStack,
pkey::{Id, PKey},
};
use pkcs8::SecretDocument;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use crate::utils::{identity_encoding::TraditionalKeyFormat, request::RequestIdentityError};
pub(in crate::utils) fn normalize(
bytes: &[u8],
format: TraditionalKeyFormat,
passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> anyhow::Result<SecretDocument> {
let key = match format {
TraditionalKeyFormat::Sec1Der => PKey::private_key_from_der(bytes),
TraditionalKeyFormat::PlainPem => PKey::private_key_from_pem_passphrase(bytes, b""),
TraditionalKeyFormat::EncryptedPem => {
let passphrase = passphrase.ok_or(RequestIdentityError::NoPassphrase("PEM"))?;
anyhow::ensure!(
!passphrase.as_bytes().contains(&0),
"Private key passphrases containing NUL are not supported"
);
PKey::private_key_from_pem_passphrase(bytes, passphrase.as_bytes())
}
}
.map_err(import_error)?;
if !matches!(key.id(), Id::RSA | Id::EC) {
return Err(RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedKeyFormat.into());
}
let der = Zeroizing::new(
key
.private_key_to_pkcs8()
.map_err(|_| RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey)?,
);
Ok(SecretDocument::try_from(der.as_slice()).map_err(|_| RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey)?)
}
fn import_error(error: ErrorStack) -> RequestIdentityError {
// Inspect only known backend reasons. Never expose the native error stack or
// turn an unclassified decoder failure into a password retry loop.
if error.errors().iter().any(|error| error.reason() == Some("bad decrypt")) {
RequestIdentityError::DecryptError("PEM")
} else if error.errors().iter().any(|error| error.reason() == Some("unsupported")) {
RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedEncryption
} else {
RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
pub(in crate::utils) fn decrypt(
_bytes: &[u8],
_pem: bool,
_passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> anyhow::Result<pkcs8::SecretDocument> {
Err(crate::utils::request::RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedEncryption.into())
}
+11 -21
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//! PEM/DER normalization; usable key and certificate imports stay with native TLS.
//! PEM/DER normalization before rustls validates usable keys and identities.
use pkcs8::{
AlgorithmIdentifierRef, EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoRef, ObjectIdentifier, PrivateKeyInfoRef, SecretDocument,
der::{
@@ -8,13 +8,7 @@ use pkcs8::{
};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use super::{certificate::traditional_key, request::RequestIdentityError};
pub(super) enum TraditionalKeyFormat {
Sec1Der,
PlainPem,
EncryptedPem,
}
use super::{certificate, request::RequestIdentityError};
struct PemBlock {
tag: String,
@@ -26,7 +20,9 @@ impl PemBlock {
fn encoded(&self) -> Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> {
let mut block = pem::Pem::new(&self.tag, self.contents.as_slice());
*block.headers_mut() = self.headers.clone();
let encoded = Zeroizing::new(pem::encode(&block).into_bytes());
let encoded = Zeroizing::new(
pem::encode_config(&block, pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(pem::LineEnding::LF)).into_bytes(),
);
// The PEM crate owns a copy of the decoded private key as well.
drop(Zeroizing::new(block.into_contents()));
encoded
@@ -77,13 +73,13 @@ pub(super) fn private_key(bytes: &[u8], passphrase: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Res
if !matches!(block.tag.as_str(), "RSA PRIVATE KEY" | "EC PRIVATE KEY") {
return Err(RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey.into());
}
traditional_key::normalize(&block.encoded(), TraditionalKeyFormat::EncryptedPem, passphrase)?
certificate::decrypt_key(&block.encoded(), true, passphrase)?
} else {
match block.tag.as_str() {
"PRIVATE KEY" => SecretDocument::try_from(der.as_slice()).map_err(|_| RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey)?,
"RSA PRIVATE KEY" => {
// PKCS#8 stores the original PKCS#1 bytes inside an RSA algorithm envelope.
// Native TLS validates the RSA key, as it does for existing PKCS#8 input.
// Rustls validates the RSA key along with the certificate.
let algorithm = AlgorithmIdentifierRef {
oid: ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.2.840.113549.1.1.1"),
parameters: Some(AnyRef::NULL),
@@ -94,11 +90,8 @@ pub(super) fn private_key(bytes: &[u8], passphrase: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Res
}
"ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" => decrypt(der, passphrase)?,
"EC PRIVATE KEY" => {
if pem_input {
traditional_key::normalize(&block.encoded(), TraditionalKeyFormat::PlainPem, passphrase)?
} else {
traditional_key::normalize(der, TraditionalKeyFormat::Sec1Der, passphrase)?
}
sec1::EcPrivateKey::from_der(der).map_err(|_| RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey)?;
return Ok(block.encoded());
}
_ => return Err(RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedKeyFormat.into()),
}
@@ -172,12 +165,9 @@ fn decrypt(der: &[u8], passphrase: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<SecretDocumen
.map_err(|_| RequestIdentityError::InvalidKey)?;
if algorithm != pkcs8::pkcs5::pbes2::PBES2_OID {
// PKCS#12 PBE-SHA1-3DES inside standalone PKCS#8 is not implemented by
// RustCrypto. Only this known legacy scheme uses the optional executable.
// RustCrypto. Only this known legacy scheme uses the native importer.
if algorithm == pkcs8::ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.2.840.113549.1.12.1.3") {
#[cfg(feature = "desktop")]
return super::certificate::legacy_pkcs8::decrypt(der, passphrase);
#[cfg(not(feature = "desktop"))]
return Err(RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedEncryption.into());
return certificate::decrypt_key(der, false, passphrase);
}
return Err(RequestIdentityError::UnsupportedEncryption.into());
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,10 @@ impl LockFile {
Ok(content) => {
let url = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/health", content.trim());
match reqwest::get(&url).await {
let Ok(client) = crate::utils::request::client_builder().build() else {
return false;
};
match client.get(&url).send().await {
Ok(resp) => resp.status().is_success(),
Err(_) => false,
}
-2
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ pub mod env_utils;
mod identity_encoding;
#[cfg(feature = "desktop")]
pub mod lock_file;
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")))]
pub mod openssl;
pub mod redact;
pub mod request;
#[cfg(feature = "tauri")]
-107
View File
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
use std::path::Path;
use log::{info, warn};
use regex::Regex;
use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
use version_compare::{Cmp, compare_to};
pub fn openssl_conf() -> String {
let option = get_openssl_option();
format!(
"openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
ssl_conf = ssl_sect
providers = provider_sect
[ssl_sect]
system_default = system_default_sect
[system_default_sect]
Options = {}
[provider_sect]
default = default_sect
legacy = legacy_sect
[default_sect]
activate = 1
[legacy_sect]
activate = 1
",
option
)
}
pub fn fix_openssl<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let content = openssl_conf();
std::fs::write(path, content)?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn fix_openssl_env() -> anyhow::Result<NamedTempFile> {
let openssl_conf = NamedTempFile::new()?;
let openssl_conf_path = openssl_conf.path();
fix_openssl(openssl_conf_path)?;
unsafe { std::env::set_var("OPENSSL_CONF", openssl_conf_path) };
Ok(openssl_conf)
}
// See: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/75763525/curl-35-error0a000152ssl-routinesunsafe-legacy-renegotiation-disabled
fn get_openssl_option() -> &'static str {
let version_str = openssl::version::version();
let default_option = "UnsafeLegacyServerConnect";
let Some(version) = extract_openssl_version(version_str) else {
warn!("Failed to extract OpenSSL version from '{}'", version_str);
return default_option;
};
let older_than_3_0_4 = match compare_to(version, "3.0.4", Cmp::Lt) {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(_) => {
warn!("Failed to compare OpenSSL version: {}", version);
return default_option;
}
};
if older_than_3_0_4 {
info!("Using 'UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation' option");
"UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation"
} else {
info!("Using 'UnsafeLegacyServerConnect' option");
default_option
}
}
fn extract_openssl_version(version: &str) -> Option<&str> {
let re = Regex::new(r"OpenSSL (\d+\.\d+\.\d+[^\s]*)").unwrap();
re.captures(version).and_then(|caps| caps.get(1)).map(|m| m.as_str())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_extract_version() {
let input = "OpenSSL 3.4.0 22 Oct 2024 (Library: OpenSSL 3.4.0 22 Oct 2024)";
assert_eq!(extract_openssl_version(input), Some("3.4.0"));
}
#[test]
fn test_different_format() {
let input = "OpenSSL 1.1.1t 7 Feb 2023";
assert_eq!(extract_openssl_version(input), Some("1.1.1t"));
}
#[test]
fn test_invalid_input() {
let input = "Invalid string without version";
assert_eq!(extract_openssl_version(input), None);
}
}
+30 -27
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use anyhow::{Context, ensure};
use reqwest::Identity;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use super::{certificate::pkcs12_identity, identity_encoding};
use super::{certificate::pkcs12, identity_encoding};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum RequestIdentityError {
@@ -18,10 +18,6 @@ pub enum RequestIdentityError {
"Unsupported private key encryption. Convert the key to modern PKCS#8 using PBES2 with AES before importing it"
)]
UnsupportedEncryption,
#[error(
"Could not convert the legacy private key with OpenSSL: {0}. Convert the key to modern PKCS#8 using PBES2 with AES before importing it"
)]
LegacyKeyConversion(&'static str),
#[error("Unsupported private key format. Convert the key to PKCS#8 before importing it")]
UnsupportedKeyFormat,
#[error("Invalid private key")]
@@ -31,7 +27,9 @@ pub enum RequestIdentityError {
#[error("The PKCS#12 file must contain both a client certificate and its private key")]
IncompletePkcs12,
#[error("Could not open the PKCS#12 certificate. Check the password and certificate file")]
InvalidPkcs12(#[source] reqwest::Error),
InvalidPkcs12(#[source] p12_keystore::error::Error),
#[error("The PKCS#12 file must contain one matching client identity")]
AmbiguousPkcs12,
}
/// Loaded once by the authentication owner. PEM keys are decrypted once; PKCS#12
@@ -91,16 +89,7 @@ impl ClientIdentity {
let (identity, passphrase) = match &key {
Some(key) => (pem_request_identity(&certificate, key)?, None),
None => {
pkcs12_identity::ensure_complete(&certificate, passphrase.unwrap_or_default())?;
// A blank settings field is stored as None. Try the empty password so
// passwordless archives work, but keep prompting for protected ones.
let identity = Identity::from_pkcs12_der(&certificate, passphrase.unwrap_or_default()).map_err(|error| {
if passphrase.is_none() {
RequestIdentityError::NoPassphrase("PKCS#12")
} else {
RequestIdentityError::InvalidPkcs12(error)
}
})?;
let identity = pkcs12::identity(&certificate, passphrase)?;
(
identity,
Some(Zeroizing::new(passphrase.unwrap_or_default().to_owned())),
@@ -160,13 +149,22 @@ impl ClientIdentityFiles {
}
}
fn pem_request_identity(certificate: &[u8], key: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Identity> {
pub(super) fn pem_request_identity(certificate: &[u8], key: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Identity> {
let error_context =
"Client certificate and private key cannot be used together. Check that the private key matches the certificate";
let identity = Identity::from_pkcs8_pem(certificate, key).context(error_context)?;
// Native TLS may defer the certificate/key match check until connector creation.
// Build the same client used for requests without making a network connection.
reqwest::Client::builder()
let mut combined = Zeroizing::new(certificate.to_vec());
combined.push(b'\n');
combined.extend_from_slice(key);
let identity = Identity::from_pem(&combined).context(error_context)?;
let certificates = rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(certificate))
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
.context(error_context)?;
let private_key = rustls_pemfile::private_key(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(key))
.context(error_context)?
.context(error_context)?;
rustls::sign::CertifiedKey::from_der(certificates, private_key, &rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider())
.context(error_context)?;
client_builder()
.no_proxy()
.identity(identity.clone())
.build()
@@ -202,6 +200,14 @@ fn write_identity_file(
Ok(file)
}
/// Ordinary Reqwest construction with the shared rustls provider initialized.
pub fn client_builder() -> reqwest::ClientBuilder {
if rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider::get_default().is_none() {
let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
}
reqwest::Client::builder().tls_backend_rustls()
}
/// General request clients may load an identity directly. Session owners call
/// ClientIdentity::load once and retain that snapshot across their lifecycle.
pub fn create_identity(cert: &str, key: Option<&str>, passphrase: Option<&str>) -> anyhow::Result<Identity> {
@@ -241,7 +247,7 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn create_identity_preserves_password_errors_and_builds_a_native_request_client() {
fn create_identity_preserves_password_errors_and_builds_a_request_client() {
let mut source = tempfile::NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
source.write_all(CERTIFICATE).unwrap();
source.write_all(ENCRYPTED_KEY).unwrap();
@@ -255,7 +261,7 @@ mod tests {
}
let identity = create_identity(source.path().to_str().unwrap(), None, Some("fixture-password")).unwrap();
drop(source);
reqwest::Client::builder().identity(identity).build().unwrap();
client_builder().identity(identity).build().unwrap();
}
#[test]
@@ -277,10 +283,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777, 0o600);
drop(files);
assert!(!Path::new(&path).exists());
reqwest::Client::builder()
.identity(identity.request_identity())
.build()
.unwrap();
client_builder().identity(identity.request_identity()).build().unwrap();
}
}