Files
GlobalProtect-openconnect/crates/gpapi/tests/files/client-identity/README.md
T
Kevin Yue 5ff3760bc0 fix: select PKCS12 issuers by certificate signature
Handle CA rollover and self-issued intermediates by checking issuer signatures. Preserve RSA-PSS signature parameters during GnuTLS verification and keep the original archive for OpenConnect.

Add mutual-TLS regression coverage for certificate bag order and RSA-PSS salt lengths. Verified 53 targeted tests plus gpapi, desktop-core, and iOS compile checks.
2026-11-07 13:27:42 +08:00

7.1 KiB

Public client identity fixtures

These generated keys and certificates are public test data, never production credentials. Passwords are fixture-password, except unicode-password.p12, which uses pässword-密码, and the rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem fixtures, which use x repeated the indicated number of bytes.

Regenerate intentionally with OpenSSL 3:

OPENSSL_BIN=/path/to/openssl bash generate.sh

Generation is random; it replaces the keys, certificates, and archives together. The test runner reads checked-in files and needs no converter executable. No fixture generation is needed to run the tests. OpenSSL is used only by the optional fixture-generation script, not identity import.

Files Contents
root.pem, rsa-cert.pem, ec-cert.pem Test root and issued RSA-2048 / P-256 client certificates, SHA256 signatures
rsa-critical-extension.pem Self-signed certificate for the existing RSA key with a private critical extension; issue #697 desktop validation regression
rsa-pkcs8.pem, ec-pkcs8.pem Plain PKCS#8 keys; expected normalized output
rsa-pkcs1.pem, ec-sec1.pem Same keys in traditional containers
{rsa,ec}-traditional-{aes128,aes192,aes256,des3}.pem Traditional encrypted PEM with AES-CBC or 3DES-CBC; password fixture-password
rsa-pbes2-sha1.pem, rsa-pbes2-sha256.pem Encrypted PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2 with SHA1 or SHA256 PRF
rsa-pbes2-aes-{128,192}-cbc-{sha1,sha256}.pem AES128/192-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256
rsa-pbes2-des3-{sha1,sha256}.pem PBES2 3DES-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256; distinct from the PKCS#12 PBE scheme handled by GnuTLS
rsa-pbes2-des.pem PBES2 DES-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256; Rust processing requires no native legacy provider
rsa-pbes2-scrypt.pem PBES2 AES256-CBC with scrypt
rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem Legacy password boundary: 127 ASCII characters import; 128 report the supported limit
rsa-pbes1-3des.pem Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES scheme inside standalone encrypted PKCS#8; private GnuTLS import case
empty-password.p12 RSA leaf/key/root with an empty password, accepted with omitted or empty password
ec-pbes2.pem Encrypted EC PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256
modern.p12, unicode-password.p12 Leaf/key/root, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256, SHA256 MAC; RSA and EC respectively
certificate-only.pfx, key-only.pfx Incomplete PKCS#12 archives: certificate without key, and key without certificate; password fixture-password
legacy-rc2.p12 Issue #437 case: RC2-40 certificate bags, SHA1/3DES key bag, SHA1 MAC
ec-p521.pem, ec-p521-cert.pem Valid P-521 identity; explicit unsupported-key error until HTTP negotiation parity exists
rsa-pss.pem, rsa-pss-cert.pem Valid RSA-PSS identity; explicit unsupported-key error until Rustls negotiation parity exists
pss-chain-{root,issuer}.pem, pss-chain-salt-{20,32,48}.pem RSA client certificates signed with RSA-PSS/SHA256 and different salt lengths; client key is rsa-pkcs8.pem. Regenerate with generate-pss-chain.sh
ec-{compressed,explicit}.pem, matching -cert.pem files Valid OpenSSL inputs rejected by the tested GnuTLS backend; actionable unsupported-encoding tests
legacy-RC4-128.p12 SHA1/RC4-128 key encryption and SHA1/3DES certificate encryption; native archive import
legacy-RC2-128.p12, legacy-2DES.p12 Unsupported archive encryption; terminal AES re-export guidance with any password

tests/client_identity.rs covers all supported key families, password failures, archive integrity, certificate/key matching, retained snapshots, private-file permissions and cleanup. tests/identity_encoding.rs covers PEM/DER, RSA PKCS#1, EC SEC1, traditional encrypted PEM, first-key selection, malformed encryption headers and archive extension capitalization. Desktop GnuTLS validates and signs client keys; portable builds keep the Rust implementation. Legacy encrypted-key imports use the private GnuTLS shim. Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES keys use a consistent limit of 127 UTF-16 code units (256 bytes including the terminator), matching older supported GnuTLS releases. Longer passwords report a clear error without exposing the password. PBES2, including scrypt, stays in Rust and does not use this limit. The no-executable child test runs with an empty PATH and imports both legacy key families and RC2 PKCS#12.

Archive integrity checks change the UTF-16 friendly name without changing the MAC. Decrypted output is compared with independent plaintext fixture keys. Unit tests in utils/request.rs cover missing keys, large local files and request client construction.

tests/client_certificate_extensions.rs covers issue #697 with generated RSA, P-256, P-384 and Ed25519 identities: no extensions, private critical and noncritical extensions, critical Netscape client type, Microsoft template, key usage and client EKU. Each is exercised as separate PEM, combined PEM, DER, PKCS#12 and a service snapshot, including snapshot/file round trips and request-client construction. Independent OpenSSL checks establish local key compatibility. TLS 1.2/1.3 tests verify client authentication with PEM and PKCS#12 and confirm the original signed certificate is sent unchanged. Negative cases retain key mismatch errors, server trust checks and server rejection of a client certificate. The checked-in critical-extension fixture also covers the shared certificate validation used by both desktop shells.

tests/certificate_compatibility.rs checks RC4-128 import, renewed identities and P-521 rejection, and typed, actionable errors for unsupported algorithms, EC encodings and archive encryption. The OpenConnect integration suite checks the real loader/handshake separately from these HTTP/import tests.

Desktop local matching and signing use GnuTLS. The VPN server validates client certificate extensions and trust; HTTP server trust still uses the platform verifier with Rustls/ring. RSA-PSS and P-521 key types deliberately fail before connecting until the HTTP transport can negotiate them correctly on both TLS versions. This differs from ordinary RSA keys producing RSA-PSS signatures, which remain supported. OpenSSL remains development-only.

tests/client_certificate_chain.rs checks mutual TLS with PKCS#12 CA rollover, including self-issued intermediates and both certificate bag orders. It also checks RSA-PSS certificate signatures with 20-, 32-, and 48-byte salts against a same-name, wrong-key issuer. The server must receive the original leaf and correct intermediate; OpenConnect must retain the original archive.

tests/client_certificate_tls12_hash.rs records the remaining TLS 1.2 P-384 with SHA-256-only peer request gap: the OpenSSL baseline passes, while the replacement reproducer is explicitly ignored pending negotiated-version-aware signing. TLS 1.3 curve restrictions must remain intact.

The unencrypted, MAC-less no-bag-ids.p12, mismatched.p12, and multiple-identities.p12 contain only the same public test keys/certificates. They exercise PKCS#12 bags without optional attributes, reversed certificate order/unrelated certificates, and terminal mismatched/ambiguous identities.