Files
GlobalProtect-openconnect/crates/gpapi/tests/files/client-identity
Kevin Yue c476dfefb0 fix: restore client certificate compatibility after OpenSSL removal
Use GnuTLS for desktop client key matching and signing without applying server certificate policy to local identities. Restore RC4 PKCS12 import and renewed certificate selection, and provide actionable unsupported identity errors.

Add HTTP and OpenConnect mutual TLS regressions. Record the unresolved TLS 1.2 ECDSA hash limitation and reject P-521 and RSA-PSS keys explicitly.
2026-11-07 11:23:19 +08:00
..

Public client identity fixtures

These generated keys and certificates are public test data, never production credentials. Passwords are fixture-password, except unicode-password.p12, which uses pässword-密码, and the rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem fixtures, which use x repeated the indicated number of bytes.

Regenerate intentionally with OpenSSL 3:

OPENSSL_BIN=/path/to/openssl bash generate.sh

Generation is random; it replaces the keys, certificates, and archives together. The test runner reads checked-in files and needs no converter executable. No fixture generation is needed to run the tests. OpenSSL is used only by the optional fixture-generation script, not identity import.

Files Contents
root.pem, rsa-cert.pem, ec-cert.pem Test root and issued RSA-2048 / P-256 client certificates, SHA256 signatures
rsa-critical-extension.pem Self-signed certificate for the existing RSA key with a private critical extension; issue #697 desktop validation regression
rsa-pkcs8.pem, ec-pkcs8.pem Plain PKCS#8 keys; expected normalized output
rsa-pkcs1.pem, ec-sec1.pem Same keys in traditional containers
{rsa,ec}-traditional-{aes128,aes192,aes256,des3}.pem Traditional encrypted PEM with AES-CBC or 3DES-CBC; password fixture-password
rsa-pbes2-sha1.pem, rsa-pbes2-sha256.pem Encrypted PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2 with SHA1 or SHA256 PRF
rsa-pbes2-aes-{128,192}-cbc-{sha1,sha256}.pem AES128/192-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256
rsa-pbes2-des3-{sha1,sha256}.pem PBES2 3DES-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256; distinct from the PKCS#12 PBE scheme handled by GnuTLS
rsa-pbes2-des.pem PBES2 DES-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256; Rust processing requires no native legacy provider
rsa-pbes2-scrypt.pem PBES2 AES256-CBC with scrypt
rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem Legacy password boundary: 127 ASCII characters import; 128 report the supported limit
rsa-pbes1-3des.pem Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES scheme inside standalone encrypted PKCS#8; private GnuTLS import case
empty-password.p12 RSA leaf/key/root with an empty password, accepted with omitted or empty password
ec-pbes2.pem Encrypted EC PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256
modern.p12, unicode-password.p12 Leaf/key/root, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256, SHA256 MAC; RSA and EC respectively
certificate-only.pfx, key-only.pfx Incomplete PKCS#12 archives: certificate without key, and key without certificate; password fixture-password
legacy-rc2.p12 Issue #437 case: RC2-40 certificate bags, SHA1/3DES key bag, SHA1 MAC
ec-p521.pem, ec-p521-cert.pem Valid P-521 identity; explicit unsupported-key error until HTTP negotiation parity exists
rsa-pss.pem, rsa-pss-cert.pem Valid RSA-PSS identity; explicit unsupported-key error until Rustls negotiation parity exists
ec-{compressed,explicit}.pem, matching -cert.pem files Valid OpenSSL inputs rejected by the tested GnuTLS backend; actionable unsupported-encoding tests
legacy-RC4-128.p12 SHA1/RC4-128 key encryption and SHA1/3DES certificate encryption; native archive import
legacy-RC2-128.p12, legacy-2DES.p12 Unsupported archive encryption; terminal AES re-export guidance with any password

tests/client_identity.rs covers all supported key families, password failures, archive integrity, certificate/key matching, retained snapshots, private-file permissions and cleanup. tests/identity_encoding.rs covers PEM/DER, RSA PKCS#1, EC SEC1, traditional encrypted PEM, first-key selection, malformed encryption headers and archive extension capitalization. Desktop GnuTLS validates and signs client keys; portable builds keep the Rust implementation. Legacy encrypted-key imports use the private GnuTLS shim. Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES keys use a consistent limit of 127 UTF-16 code units (256 bytes including the terminator), matching older supported GnuTLS releases. Longer passwords report a clear error without exposing the password. PBES2, including scrypt, stays in Rust and does not use this limit. The no-executable child test runs with an empty PATH and imports both legacy key families and RC2 PKCS#12.

Archive integrity checks change the UTF-16 friendly name without changing the MAC. Decrypted output is compared with independent plaintext fixture keys. Unit tests in utils/request.rs cover missing keys, large local files and request client construction.

tests/client_certificate_extensions.rs covers issue #697 with generated RSA, P-256, P-384 and Ed25519 identities: no extensions, private critical and noncritical extensions, critical Netscape client type, Microsoft template, key usage and client EKU. Each is exercised as separate PEM, combined PEM, DER, PKCS#12 and a service snapshot, including snapshot/file round trips and request-client construction. Independent OpenSSL checks establish local key compatibility. TLS 1.2/1.3 tests verify client authentication with PEM and PKCS#12 and confirm the original signed certificate is sent unchanged. Negative cases retain key mismatch errors, server trust checks and server rejection of a client certificate. The checked-in critical-extension fixture also covers the shared certificate validation used by both desktop shells.

tests/certificate_compatibility.rs checks RC4-128 import, renewed identities and P-521 rejection, and typed, actionable errors for unsupported algorithms, EC encodings and archive encryption. The OpenConnect integration suite checks the real loader/handshake separately from these HTTP/import tests.

Desktop local matching and signing use GnuTLS. The VPN server validates client certificate extensions and trust; HTTP server trust still uses the platform verifier with Rustls/ring. RSA-PSS and P-521 key types deliberately fail before connecting until the HTTP transport can negotiate them correctly on both TLS versions. This differs from ordinary RSA keys producing RSA-PSS signatures, which remain supported. OpenSSL remains development-only.

tests/client_certificate_tls12_hash.rs records the remaining TLS 1.2 P-384 with SHA-256-only peer request gap: the OpenSSL baseline passes, while the replacement reproducer is explicitly ignored pending negotiated-version-aware signing. TLS 1.3 curve restrictions must remain intact.

The unencrypted, MAC-less no-bag-ids.p12, mismatched.p12, and multiple-identities.p12 contain only the same public test keys/certificates. They exercise PKCS#12 bags without optional attributes, reversed certificate order/unrelated certificates, and terminal mismatched/ambiguous identities.