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GlobalProtect-openconnect/crates/gpapi/tests/files/client-identity/README.md
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Kevin Yue 408536807c chore: promote GP Connect 3.3.1 sources and Nix packages (#699)
* fix: restore client certificate compatibility after OpenSSL removal

Use GnuTLS for desktop client key matching and signing without applying server certificate policy to local identities. Restore RC4 PKCS12 import and renewed certificate selection, and provide actionable unsupported identity errors.

Add HTTP and OpenConnect mutual TLS regressions. Record the unresolved TLS 1.2 ECDSA hash limitation and reject P-521 and RSA-PSS keys explicitly.

* fix: select PKCS12 issuers by certificate signature

Handle CA rollover and self-issued intermediates by checking issuer signatures. Preserve RSA-PSS signature parameters during GnuTLS verification and keep the original archive for OpenConnect.

Add mutual-TLS regression coverage for certificate bag order and RSA-PSS salt lengths. Verified 53 targeted tests plus gpapi, desktop-core, and iOS compile checks.

* fix: add gateway login diagnostics and scope platform dependencies

* chore: prepare GP Connect 3.3.1 release
2026-11-09 00:51:46 +08:00

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# Public client identity fixtures
These generated keys and certificates are **public test data**, never production
credentials. Passwords are `fixture-password`, except `unicode-password.p12`,
which uses `pässword-密码`, and the `rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem`
fixtures, which use `x` repeated the indicated number of bytes.
Regenerate intentionally with OpenSSL 3:
```sh
OPENSSL_BIN=/path/to/openssl bash generate.sh
```
Generation is random; it replaces the keys, certificates, and archives together.
The test runner reads checked-in files and needs no converter executable.
No fixture generation is needed to run the tests. OpenSSL is used only by the
optional fixture-generation script, not identity import.
| Files | Contents |
| --- | --- |
| `root.pem`, `rsa-cert.pem`, `ec-cert.pem` | Test root and issued RSA-2048 / P-256 client certificates, SHA256 signatures |
| `rsa-critical-extension.pem` | Self-signed certificate for the existing RSA key with a private critical extension; issue #697 desktop validation regression |
| `rsa-pkcs8.pem`, `ec-pkcs8.pem` | Plain PKCS#8 keys; expected normalized output |
| `rsa-pkcs1.pem`, `ec-sec1.pem` | Same keys in traditional containers |
| `{rsa,ec}-traditional-{aes128,aes192,aes256,des3}.pem` | Traditional encrypted PEM with AES-CBC or 3DES-CBC; password `fixture-password` |
| `rsa-pbes2-sha1.pem`, `rsa-pbes2-sha256.pem` | Encrypted PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2 with SHA1 or SHA256 PRF |
| `rsa-pbes2-aes-{128,192}-cbc-{sha1,sha256}.pem` | AES128/192-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256 |
| `rsa-pbes2-des3-{sha1,sha256}.pem` | PBES2 3DES-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256; distinct from the PKCS#12 PBE scheme handled by GnuTLS |
| `rsa-pbes2-des.pem` | PBES2 DES-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256; Rust processing requires no native legacy provider |
| `rsa-pbes2-scrypt.pem` | PBES2 AES256-CBC with scrypt |
| `rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem` | Legacy password boundary: 127 ASCII characters import; 128 report the supported limit |
| `rsa-pbes1-3des.pem` | Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES scheme inside standalone encrypted PKCS#8; private GnuTLS import case |
| `empty-password.p12` | RSA leaf/key/root with an empty password, accepted with omitted or empty password |
| `ec-pbes2.pem` | Encrypted EC PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256 |
| `modern.p12`, `unicode-password.p12` | Leaf/key/root, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256, SHA256 MAC; RSA and EC respectively |
| `certificate-only.pfx`, `key-only.pfx` | Incomplete PKCS#12 archives: certificate without key, and key without certificate; password `fixture-password` |
| `legacy-rc2.p12` | Issue #437 case: RC2-40 certificate bags, SHA1/3DES key bag, SHA1 MAC |
| `ec-p521.pem`, `ec-p521-cert.pem` | Valid P-521 identity; explicit unsupported-key error until HTTP negotiation parity exists |
| `rsa-pss.pem`, `rsa-pss-cert.pem` | Valid RSA-PSS identity; explicit unsupported-key error until Rustls negotiation parity exists |
| `pss-chain-{root,issuer}.pem`, `pss-chain-salt-{20,32,48}.pem` | RSA client certificates signed with RSA-PSS/SHA256 and different salt lengths; client key is `rsa-pkcs8.pem`. Regenerate with `generate-pss-chain.sh` |
| `ec-{compressed,explicit}.pem`, matching `-cert.pem` files | Valid OpenSSL inputs rejected by the tested GnuTLS backend; actionable unsupported-encoding tests |
| `legacy-RC4-128.p12` | SHA1/RC4-128 key encryption and SHA1/3DES certificate encryption; native archive import |
| `legacy-RC2-128.p12`, `legacy-2DES.p12` | Unsupported archive encryption; terminal AES re-export guidance with any password |
`tests/client_identity.rs` covers all supported key families, password failures,
archive integrity, certificate/key matching, retained snapshots, private-file
permissions and cleanup. `tests/identity_encoding.rs` covers PEM/DER, RSA PKCS#1,
EC SEC1, traditional encrypted PEM, first-key selection, malformed encryption
headers and archive extension capitalization. Desktop GnuTLS validates and signs client keys; portable builds keep the Rust
implementation. Legacy encrypted-key imports use the private GnuTLS shim.
Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES keys use a consistent limit of 127 UTF-16 code units
(256 bytes including the terminator), matching older supported GnuTLS releases.
Longer passwords report a clear error without exposing the password.
PBES2, including scrypt, stays in Rust and does not use this limit. The
no-executable child test runs with an empty PATH and imports both legacy key
families and RC2 PKCS#12.
Archive integrity checks change the UTF-16 friendly name without changing the
MAC. Decrypted output is compared with independent plaintext fixture keys.
Unit tests in `utils/request.rs` cover missing keys, large local files and request
client construction.
`tests/client_certificate_extensions.rs` covers issue #697 with generated
RSA, P-256, P-384 and Ed25519 identities: no extensions, private critical and
noncritical extensions, critical Netscape client type, Microsoft template,
key usage and client EKU. Each is exercised as separate PEM, combined PEM,
DER, PKCS#12 and a service snapshot, including snapshot/file round trips and
request-client construction. Independent OpenSSL checks establish local key
compatibility. TLS 1.2/1.3 tests verify client authentication with PEM and
PKCS#12 and confirm the original signed certificate is sent unchanged. Negative
cases retain key mismatch errors, server trust checks and server rejection of
a client certificate. The checked-in critical-extension fixture also covers
the shared certificate validation used by both desktop shells.
`tests/certificate_compatibility.rs` checks RC4-128 import, renewed identities and P-521 rejection,
and typed, actionable errors for unsupported algorithms,
EC encodings and archive encryption. The OpenConnect integration suite checks
the real loader/handshake separately from these HTTP/import tests.
Desktop local matching and signing use GnuTLS. The VPN server validates client
certificate extensions and trust; HTTP server trust still uses the platform
verifier with Rustls/ring. RSA-PSS and P-521 key types deliberately fail before connecting
until the HTTP transport can negotiate them correctly on both TLS versions.
This differs from ordinary RSA keys producing RSA-PSS signatures, which remain
supported. OpenSSL remains development-only.
`tests/client_certificate_chain.rs` checks mutual TLS with PKCS#12 CA rollover,
including self-issued intermediates and both certificate bag orders. It also
checks RSA-PSS certificate signatures with 20-, 32-, and 48-byte salts against
a same-name, wrong-key issuer. The server must receive the original leaf and
correct intermediate; OpenConnect must retain the original archive.
`tests/client_certificate_tls12_hash.rs` records the remaining TLS 1.2 P-384
with SHA-256-only peer request gap: the OpenSSL baseline passes, while the
replacement reproducer is explicitly ignored pending negotiated-version-aware
signing. TLS 1.3 curve restrictions must remain intact.
The unencrypted, MAC-less `no-bag-ids.p12`, `mismatched.p12`, and
`multiple-identities.p12` contain only the same public test keys/certificates.
They exercise PKCS#12 bags without optional attributes, reversed certificate
order/unrelated certificates, and terminal mismatched/ambiguous identities.