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Handle CA rollover and self-issued intermediates by checking issuer signatures. Preserve RSA-PSS signature parameters during GnuTLS verification and keep the original archive for OpenConnect. Add mutual-TLS regression coverage for certificate bag order and RSA-PSS salt lengths. Verified 53 targeted tests plus gpapi, desktop-core, and iOS compile checks.
103 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
103 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
# Public client identity fixtures
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These generated keys and certificates are **public test data**, never production
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credentials. Passwords are `fixture-password`, except `unicode-password.p12`,
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which uses `pässword-密码`, and the `rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem`
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fixtures, which use `x` repeated the indicated number of bytes.
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Regenerate intentionally with OpenSSL 3:
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```sh
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OPENSSL_BIN=/path/to/openssl bash generate.sh
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```
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Generation is random; it replaces the keys, certificates, and archives together.
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The test runner reads checked-in files and needs no converter executable.
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No fixture generation is needed to run the tests. OpenSSL is used only by the
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optional fixture-generation script, not identity import.
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| Files | Contents |
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| --- | --- |
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| `root.pem`, `rsa-cert.pem`, `ec-cert.pem` | Test root and issued RSA-2048 / P-256 client certificates, SHA256 signatures |
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| `rsa-critical-extension.pem` | Self-signed certificate for the existing RSA key with a private critical extension; issue #697 desktop validation regression |
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| `rsa-pkcs8.pem`, `ec-pkcs8.pem` | Plain PKCS#8 keys; expected normalized output |
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| `rsa-pkcs1.pem`, `ec-sec1.pem` | Same keys in traditional containers |
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| `{rsa,ec}-traditional-{aes128,aes192,aes256,des3}.pem` | Traditional encrypted PEM with AES-CBC or 3DES-CBC; password `fixture-password` |
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| `rsa-pbes2-sha1.pem`, `rsa-pbes2-sha256.pem` | Encrypted PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2 with SHA1 or SHA256 PRF |
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| `rsa-pbes2-aes-{128,192}-cbc-{sha1,sha256}.pem` | AES128/192-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256 |
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| `rsa-pbes2-des3-{sha1,sha256}.pem` | PBES2 3DES-CBC with PBKDF2 SHA1/SHA256; distinct from the PKCS#12 PBE scheme handled by GnuTLS |
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| `rsa-pbes2-des.pem` | PBES2 DES-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256; Rust processing requires no native legacy provider |
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| `rsa-pbes2-scrypt.pem` | PBES2 AES256-CBC with scrypt |
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| `rsa-pbes1-3des-password-{127,128}.pem` | Legacy password boundary: 127 ASCII characters import; 128 report the supported limit |
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| `rsa-pbes1-3des.pem` | Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES scheme inside standalone encrypted PKCS#8; private GnuTLS import case |
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| `empty-password.p12` | RSA leaf/key/root with an empty password, accepted with omitted or empty password |
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| `ec-pbes2.pem` | Encrypted EC PKCS#8, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256 |
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| `modern.p12`, `unicode-password.p12` | Leaf/key/root, AES256-CBC/PBKDF2-SHA256, SHA256 MAC; RSA and EC respectively |
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| `certificate-only.pfx`, `key-only.pfx` | Incomplete PKCS#12 archives: certificate without key, and key without certificate; password `fixture-password` |
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| `legacy-rc2.p12` | Issue #437 case: RC2-40 certificate bags, SHA1/3DES key bag, SHA1 MAC |
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| `ec-p521.pem`, `ec-p521-cert.pem` | Valid P-521 identity; explicit unsupported-key error until HTTP negotiation parity exists |
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| `rsa-pss.pem`, `rsa-pss-cert.pem` | Valid RSA-PSS identity; explicit unsupported-key error until Rustls negotiation parity exists |
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| `pss-chain-{root,issuer}.pem`, `pss-chain-salt-{20,32,48}.pem` | RSA client certificates signed with RSA-PSS/SHA256 and different salt lengths; client key is `rsa-pkcs8.pem`. Regenerate with `generate-pss-chain.sh` |
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| `ec-{compressed,explicit}.pem`, matching `-cert.pem` files | Valid OpenSSL inputs rejected by the tested GnuTLS backend; actionable unsupported-encoding tests |
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| `legacy-RC4-128.p12` | SHA1/RC4-128 key encryption and SHA1/3DES certificate encryption; native archive import |
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| `legacy-RC2-128.p12`, `legacy-2DES.p12` | Unsupported archive encryption; terminal AES re-export guidance with any password |
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`tests/client_identity.rs` covers all supported key families, password failures,
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archive integrity, certificate/key matching, retained snapshots, private-file
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permissions and cleanup. `tests/identity_encoding.rs` covers PEM/DER, RSA PKCS#1,
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EC SEC1, traditional encrypted PEM, first-key selection, malformed encryption
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headers and archive extension capitalization. Desktop GnuTLS validates and signs client keys; portable builds keep the Rust
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implementation. Legacy encrypted-key imports use the private GnuTLS shim.
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Legacy PKCS#12 SHA1/3DES keys use a consistent limit of 127 UTF-16 code units
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(256 bytes including the terminator), matching older supported GnuTLS releases.
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Longer passwords report a clear error without exposing the password.
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PBES2, including scrypt, stays in Rust and does not use this limit. The
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no-executable child test runs with an empty PATH and imports both legacy key
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families and RC2 PKCS#12.
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Archive integrity checks change the UTF-16 friendly name without changing the
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MAC. Decrypted output is compared with independent plaintext fixture keys.
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Unit tests in `utils/request.rs` cover missing keys, large local files and request
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client construction.
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`tests/client_certificate_extensions.rs` covers issue #697 with generated
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RSA, P-256, P-384 and Ed25519 identities: no extensions, private critical and
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noncritical extensions, critical Netscape client type, Microsoft template,
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key usage and client EKU. Each is exercised as separate PEM, combined PEM,
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DER, PKCS#12 and a service snapshot, including snapshot/file round trips and
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request-client construction. Independent OpenSSL checks establish local key
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compatibility. TLS 1.2/1.3 tests verify client authentication with PEM and
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PKCS#12 and confirm the original signed certificate is sent unchanged. Negative
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cases retain key mismatch errors, server trust checks and server rejection of
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a client certificate. The checked-in critical-extension fixture also covers
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the shared certificate validation used by both desktop shells.
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`tests/certificate_compatibility.rs` checks RC4-128 import, renewed identities and P-521 rejection,
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and typed, actionable errors for unsupported algorithms,
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EC encodings and archive encryption. The OpenConnect integration suite checks
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the real loader/handshake separately from these HTTP/import tests.
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Desktop local matching and signing use GnuTLS. The VPN server validates client
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certificate extensions and trust; HTTP server trust still uses the platform
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verifier with Rustls/ring. RSA-PSS and P-521 key types deliberately fail before connecting
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until the HTTP transport can negotiate them correctly on both TLS versions.
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This differs from ordinary RSA keys producing RSA-PSS signatures, which remain
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supported. OpenSSL remains development-only.
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`tests/client_certificate_chain.rs` checks mutual TLS with PKCS#12 CA rollover,
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including self-issued intermediates and both certificate bag orders. It also
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checks RSA-PSS certificate signatures with 20-, 32-, and 48-byte salts against
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a same-name, wrong-key issuer. The server must receive the original leaf and
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correct intermediate; OpenConnect must retain the original archive.
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`tests/client_certificate_tls12_hash.rs` records the remaining TLS 1.2 P-384
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with SHA-256-only peer request gap: the OpenSSL baseline passes, while the
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replacement reproducer is explicitly ignored pending negotiated-version-aware
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signing. TLS 1.3 curve restrictions must remain intact.
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The unencrypted, MAC-less `no-bag-ids.p12`, `mismatched.p12`, and
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`multiple-identities.p12` contain only the same public test keys/certificates.
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They exercise PKCS#12 bags without optional attributes, reversed certificate
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order/unrelated certificates, and terminal mismatched/ambiguous identities.
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